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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IN FRANCE AND GERMANY

John P. Dawson*
DURFEE studied long and closely the subject of specific
performance. He taught it for many years, wrote about it
and planned to ·write more. He conceived it broadly, as he did
every subject that ever had his attention, but he had a lively
interest in details, including very technical details. Long before
others and much more than most, he saw the importance of our
remedial system both in shaping law and as a reflection of its
larger purposes. All those who learned from him will remember
as long as memory lasts the insight he gave and the hidden meanings he extracted from careful study of lawyers' technique. He
was also fascinated by history, and was a fine historian in his
own right. This study, which will be largely historical, aims to
follow one of the many lines of his own interests and to mark
in small degree the lasting effects of his influence. It is also meant
to express some of the sorrow felt by so many at the death of
this wise, gifted and beloved man.
The casebook on Remedies used for years at the University
of Michigan Law School contained an opening chapter prepared
by Edgar and entitled "History of Our Remedial System." At
an early point appears the statement:
"The most striking feature of English procedure from the
earliest period of recorded history to the close of the twelfth
century was the total absence of anything which could be
called a damage remedy in the modern sense."
He then.went on to describe the process by which specific relief
was gradually displaced by damages: first as an incidental feature
in actions to recover land and then through the increasingly
popular and highly expansible action of trespass. The net result,
as he described it, was that except for ejectment, replevin, and
the extraordinary remedies (mandamus, prohibition, and so on),
the common law system became committed to damages as its mode
of relief. This growth also was gradual, but was well under way
by 1450. If the common law system is viewed as a whole, there was
a strange progression-from exclusive reliance on specific relief,
to an almost exclusive reliance on damages, to a mixed system
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that employs them both and regulates competition between them
by the adequacy test. The story is interesting in itself, still more
the reasons as he described them.
Developments occurred in Roman law that were, at least
externally, parallel. It is interesting to inquire why the two
great legal systems of the western world should have followed,
in broad outline, a similar course. Roman law also deserves some
attention because of its lasting influence on the thought of western
Europe, even though its two leading systems-the French and
the German-solved the problems of specific performance in
radically different ways.

I. Roman Law
It was apparently true, as Gaius said, that the praetorian procedure of classical Roman law knew only the money judgment.
Writing· about the middle of the second century A. D., Gaiuswas describing the formula that the praetor prepared after hearing the parties. The formula named the iudex, a layman chosen
with the consent of the parties, and authorized him to render
judgment on the issues defined in the formula. Gaius' comment
was:
"In all formulas containing a condemnation, the condemnations are expressed through valuation in money. And
so, even though the action is to recover a specific thing, such
as land, a slave, a garment, gold or silver, the iudex does not
order the defendant to deliver the specific thing, as was the
practice in early times, [but] orders him to pay money after
estimating its value."1
Indirect evidence from many sources confirms the flat statement
that in Gaius' own time civil actions under the praetorian system ended in money judgments. The problem comes with the
cryptic suggestion that "in early times" ( olim) specific relief
was normal.
The historical problem is so fundamental that most modern
Romanists have had something to say on the subject.2 Full agree1 GAius, INSTITUTES, IV 48. I -believe this phrasing expresses the accepted view, though
there are great difficulties with the passage, since no "·but" appears in the Latin text
and a change in punctuation would alter the sense of the last sentence. The problem is
reviewed ,by Zulueta in the note to this passage in his edition of Gaius.
2 A useful review of the nineteenth century literature is given by Pfaff, "Zur Lehre
von der Condematio Pecuniaria im roemischen Formularprozess," 34 JURISTISCHE VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT (n.s. vol. 18) 49-71 (Wien, 1903).
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ment is not yet reached, but the opinion that now seems to
prevail would ascribe whatever specific relief there was, not to
state-organized courts, but to private self-help. It seems clear
enough that at the time of the Twelve Tables a debtor who defaulted in paying a money judgment could be killed or enslaved
by the judgment creditor. If the dispute related to a specific asset
detained by the defendant, the owner after establishing his ownership was free to use force to seize it.8 The original function of adjudication was to define the limits of authorized self-help, conceived as a form of vengeance. Only gradually was its severity
modified and centuries passed before it was displaced. The mitigating agent was a judge-arbitrator who used a money award as
a means of effecting composition and buying off the feud. 4 If this
is true, the specific relief to which Gaius referred was at the opposite end of the scale from the specific relief of twelfth century
English law, which came from great kings who made available to
private litigants their own large powers to command.
If this account of origins is accepted, it still does not explain
the triumph of the money judgment under the late Republic and
the Empire, when self-help had been largely supplanted by a
state-controlled system of remedies. But one further point should
be noted. Praetorian procedure was sharply divided between proceedings before the praetor, leading to issuance of the formula,
and the trial itself, conducted by the iudex. The iudex ·was a
layman, chosen ad hoc by praetor and litigants, for the particular
case. He was not, like the praetor, an elected public official with
a year's term of office and with a high magistrate's power to
enlist public force. The persons chosen to serve as iudex were
often men of high rank in Roman society, but it is not surprising
that they were not entrusted with extensive powers in framing
a Some authors have followed the view expressed by GIRARD, MANUEL ELEMENTAIRE
DU DRorr ROMAIN, 8th ed., 360-361 (1929), in finding indirect pressure to surrender
specific property through the liabilities imposed on the sureties required by legis actio
procedure. The argument was that a possessor of land or goods who failed to establish
his title would not himself incur any liability on failure to surrender the object sued
for but that his surety (usually a relative or friend) would be subject to seizure, slavery
or possibly death. Koschaker, 50 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY·STIFTUNG FUER R.ECHTSGESCHICIITE
(roem.) 357-358 (1930), found no evidence that the surety was liable for anything more
than the destruction, injury and possibly the fruits of the object sued for, so that recovery
of the object itself would depend on self-help seizure by the successful party.
4c Koschaker, 50 zss (roem.) 355-357; SOHM•MITIEIS•WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES ROEMIS·
CHEN R.ECHTS, 17th ed., §116 (1928); WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES ROEMISCHEN ZIVILPROZESS·
RECHTS 135-136 (1925).
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prov1s1ons for specific relief and in arresting or fining for disobedience of their commands. If there is a single reason for reliance on money judgments in classical procedure, it is the practice
of pre-empting prominent laymen to perform judicial duties.
The iudices were much more than jurors of the type developed
by the common law, but in both systems the posting of laymen in
a crucial position set limits to procedural growth and thus had
lasting effects on the law itself.
But the Romans were also inventive. They discovered that
money judgments could be employed not merely as simple punishment but as instruments for coercion. The technical means employed was language in the formula that gave the iudex freedom
in fixing the sum to be paid. His freedom could be unlimited or
could have an upper limit (taxatio) imposed. From Gaius it
appears that both types of formula were in use in the second
century A.D.5 and his testimony is confirmed by other sources,
most of them somewhat later in time. They were concerned with
the simple case of an order to surrender a specific object. The
claimant in such a case was allowed to swear to an inflated value,
apparently without penalties for perjury. If the defendant did
not obey the order to surrender the object, judgment was entered
for the sum thus inflated; some jurists were explicit that this
was because of the defendant's "contumacy" in disobeying the
command of the iudex.6 The net result was a system of money
fines, payable not to the state but to the opposite party and involving incidentally a considerable enlargement of the judge's
power in compelling surrender of specific assets.
For persons familiar with our equitable remedies, much
greater interest attaches to controls over conduct through mandatory or negative injunction. Such injunctions, described as inter5 GAIUS, INSTITUI'ES, IV 51.
6 D. 12.3.1 (Ulpian): "We

do not consider that property which is the subject of
litigation is worth more, because the judgment can :be augmented, on account of the
contumacy of him who does not restore it, by an oath [of the plaintiff] taken in the
cause. For the property is not thereby rendered of greater worth; on account of contumacy it is estimated at a price beyond its value." Similar ideas appear in D. 4.3.18
(Paul); D. 6.1.68 (Ulpian); D. 12.3.2 (Paul); D. 12.3.8 (Marcellus). Indirect confirmation
comes from D. 46.1.73 (Paul) and D. 35.2.60.1 (Javolenus). Paul in D. 12.3.11 asserted that
it was not customary to inquire "concerning the perjury of him who took an oath as
to value through legal necessity" (ex necessitate iuris).
These aspects of praetorian procedure are discussed by many authors, among them
BUCKLAND, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW, 2d ed., 659-660 (1932); WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES
ROEMISCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS 138-141 (1925); SOHM-MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN ·»ES
ROEMISCHEN RECHTS 694-697 (1928); BUCKLAND, EQUITY IN ROMAN LAW 28-30 (1911).
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diets, were well known and widely used. They were issued on the
authority of the praetor after special hearing. To one familiar with
the assumptions of Anglo-American law, it would seem that such
orders, cast in emphatic terms, would engage the prestige and
authority of the praetor to such a degree that special measures
would have been organized to ensure compliance. There is in
fact one instance, late in the classical period, where Ulpian proposed that the praetor proceed extra ordinem to compel a funeral
to be held for a deceased person in accordance with a promise
made to the deceased person in his lifetime. 7 There was another
instance in which the enforcement of a negative injunction was
issued against interference with a privileged entry on land, with
the statement that it was within the functions of the iudex to
"force" the defendant to comply. 8 But in this, as in several other
instances where similar statements were made, the kind of "force"
that could be used was not defined. In general, it seems quite
clear that disobedience of an interdict led to a standard trial
and money judgment, despite the strong language in which the
interdicts were often cast.9
This was not the whole story, however, even for classical
law. The political authority that was concentrated in Augustus
and his successors was exercised increasingly by functionaries
appointed by them. The powers of the ruler penetrated all phases
of government and administration as the principate was transformed into empire. One symptom of change was the creation of
special imperial courts, operating ·extra ordinem-outside the
order of formulary procedure-and staffed with permanent officials
who were delegates of the emperors. Like the English Chancellors,
these magistrates created a system of remedies that persisted side
by side and competed with the older formulary system, though
after perhaps two centuries (unlike the English Chancellors),
they ended by displacing the older system, which disappeared en7 D. 11.7.14.2 (Ulpian): "If a testator directed (mandaverit) a certain person to
provide a funeral for him and this person does not provide the funeral after receiving
money [for the purpose], Mela writes that an action for fraud should be awarded against
him; but I believe that he should be compelled by the praetor extra ordinem to hold
the funeral." Another case of compulsion to perform funeral rites is D. 40.4.44.
8 D. 19.2.19.5 (Ulpian).
9 BUCKLAND, EQUITY IN ROMAN LAw 28-30 (1911), referring, however, to D. 43.29.3.13
where repetition of the praetor's command, with the possibility of repeated fines, was
suggested as an appropriate measure in a type of case that was especially appealingcontinued detention as a slave of a person found to be free.
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tirely. The extraordinary system of imperial courts was well
known to classical lawyers, who made it plain that the imperial
judges were ready to take on some difficult tasks. The judges specially assigned by the emperor to the enforcement of fideicommissa
could compel the surrender of property that had been subjected to
this form of charge.10 A father could be ordered to emancipate his
sons or an owner to free his slaves.11 Parents could be compelled to
arrange marriages for their children and provide them with dowries;12 an heir to erect a monument. 18
In the post-classical peri~d (after 235 A.D.) it is clear that
these developments were carried still further. The imperial courts
became the ordinary courts for civil litigation. During the 300
years that elapsed before Justinian's Corpus Juris was promulgated, the lives and energies of the whole population were increasingly constricted by the oppressive weight of a great imperial
bureaucracy. It would have been strange if the imperial courts
had accepted limitations that had seemed appropriate for the
citizen judges of the praetorian system. Few details survive as
to the procedure used for enforcement of obligations, and most
of the evidence is indirect. But Justinian himself expressed amazement that a judge could accept the views of classical jurists and
merely decree a money judgment against a person obligated t~
free a slave; he directed his judges not to be so stupid (stultum)
in the future. 14 Though the evidence is sketchy, we can be quite
sure that specific performance could be awarded under the late
Empire whenever imperial judges considered it suitable.
The compilers of the Corpus Juris, in their fidelity to ancient
traditions, left untouched most of the classical texts dealing with
this subject. But there was one that they corrected and brought
up to date. It was a text from Ulpian, appearing in the chapter
concerning an owner's action to recover specific property that
was wrongfully detained (De Rei Vindicatione ). In this standard
case Ulpian had given the standard answer of the classical jurists10 D.

43.4.3. pr. (Ulpian).
35.1.92; D. 40.5.28.4; D. 40.5.26.7; D. 40.5.1-4. In the event of disobedience, the
decree of the imperial official was, as we would say, self-executing, even as against absent
persons.
12 D. 23.2.19 (Marcian).
13 D. 5.3.50.l (Papinian). The cases referred to in notes 11-13 did not involve specific
enforcement of contracts; most arose through the receipt of conditional 'gifts by will.
14 C. 7.4.17. Other references to the late imperial period are collected by Pfaff, cited
note 2 supra, pp. 97-104.

11 D.

1959]

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

501

the remedy was a money judgment but the judgment could be
inflated to punish a defendant whose failure to surrender was due
to his own "fraud." What the compilers did was to insert a single
clause-if the defendant has the property sued for, it will be
taken from him "by military force on the authority of the iudex"
(manu militari officio iudicis). 15 This simple statement contradicted almost all the classical texts, which on this issue had been
more than usually consistent. The purpose no doubt in inserting
it was to make the text express the practice of Justinian's time.
The compilers could hardly have foreseen all the uses that would
be made of it.
Two other texts must also be mentioned, both quoting Celsus,
a jurist of approximately Gaius' time (the second century A.D.).
In one of them Celsus was discussing the liability of a surety
who had guaranteed another promisor against loss. Celsus concluded that if loss occurred the guarantor should be condemned
to pay a sum certain in money "as happens in all obligations to
do." 16 This casual remark was thrown off in a case where a money
judgment was plainly an appropriate, if not the only possible,
remedy. It seems most unlikely that Celsus was trying to express
a basic distinction. As has been said, the general principle of
praetorian procedure at the time he wrote was that all obligations
were translated into money judgments, whether they involved doing, not doing, surrendering specific property or anything else.
Classical jurists occasionally spoke of "doing" or "giving" as the
subjects of obligations but in other discussions any effective
distinction between them was washed away. 17 What Celsus had
15 D. 6.1.68. The text is important enough to be reproduced in full. Brackets are
placed around the interpolated passage:
"He who has been ordered to restore and does not obey the iudex, contending
that he cannot restore; [if indeed he has the property, possession shall be transferred from him with military force by the authority of the iudex and there shall be
judgment only as to the profits and all causae. But if ,he cannot restore] if he has
acted fraudulently so as not to be able to do so, he shall be ordered to pay as much
as his adversary swears to in the action, without any limitation, however high. But
if he cannot restore, and has not acted fraudulently so as not to be able to, he
should be adjudged to pay not more than what it is worth, that is, the value of his
adversary's interest. This is the general rule and applies to all cases where anything
is to be restored by decision of the iudex, whether in interdicts or actions in rem or
actions in personam."
16 D. 42.I.13.I.
17 For example, D. 45.1.2. pr. says: "Some stipulations involve giving and some
involve doing." Formulas addressed to iudices often said that they were to decide what
the defendant was "to do or to give." But in D. 50.16.218 Paul was quoted: "The term
'to do' (facere) includes every ·kind of doing such as giving, paying, judging or walking."
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in mind in his oblique and unnecessary remark is extremely hard
to say. A clue may perhaps be found in another text in which
Ulpian suggested that a money judgment was the appropriate
solution where several persons were obligated to render an indivisible performance (as by transferring a tract of land, creating
a servitude, or building a house) and the problem was to distribute the burden between them. In this context Ulpian quoted
the opinion of Celsus that in obligations "to do" the obligors in
the event of breach should be required to pay money.18 The
passage taken as a whole gave not the least support for any sharp
distinction between "doing" and "giving," for Ulpian plainly
included in "doing" not only acts and abstention, but also "giving"
by transferring specific land. It is surely the most amazing thing
that from materials like these there could have been built a set
of basic limitations on judicial power in a modem society.
The main reason that such a system was built was that the
medieval schoolmen in Italy had no sense of history and believed
what they ·read. Handicapped as they were by this double limitation, they did extremely well.

2. Medieval Roman Law
The study of Roman law was resumed shortly before 1100
by the glossators of Bologna. They started from the assumption
that the whole of the Corpus Juris was still valid law in Italy. The
possibility that some texts were corrupted never entered their
minds. And if it had, the Corpus Juris had in any case been promulgated by a Holy Roman Emperor as law in his dominions;
for the glossators it stated in ultimate form the rules and the
values that must guide human society, past and future; it summed
up the wisdom of antiquity. Contradictions and obscurities there
were, but they were merely a challenge to closer study in order
to explain them away. The manner of explaining them that was
least acceptable to the doctors is the one that any modem reader
would chiefly emphasize: there was bound to be conflict in the
texts of the Corpus Juris because many of the rules it contained
had been superseded or modified in the long stretch of time
the Roman system had lasted. The doctors of Bologna had no
tools that could dig through the layers of human experience recorded there, all jumbled up together.
18 D.

45.1.72.
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The Bolognese doctors quickly discovered that on the subject
of specific performance there was conflict in the texts. The problem that first drew their attention was the contract of sale with
seller refusing to make delivery-could he be forced specifically
( praecise) to perform? All but one of the doctors accepted the
verdict of the classical texts and said he could not. The single
dissenter was Martinus, one of the Four Doctors of Bologna,
who was well known at the time for his advanced and somewhat
radical views. 19 Martinus argued that since the vendor's obligation was to transfer the specific thing, he should be compelled to
do so if this was possible, and he asked the somewhat harrowing
question: "If you have sold bread, have not delivered it, and I
have died of hunger, will a money judgment suffice?" But the
texts he was able to cite for his view were drawn from scattered
sources and were not very persuasive.20 As the debates progressed,
Martinus invoked another text, the interpolated passage from
Ulpian which authorized "military force" to recover an asset
withheld from an owner. This text apparently made an impression,
though the other doctors disposed of it for the moment by saying
that it did not apply to contracts to sell but only to claims rested
on an ownership already acquired.21 Then there appeared, in
further support of the majority view, a contention that Justice
Holmes has made familiar to us-a promisor who paid damages
instead of performing was merely exercising a privilege given by
law.22 Though they did not talk about "bad men."
The great summarizing gloss of Accursius (1182-1260) had
as one of its principal objects the settlement of questions that had
been disputed among the earlier doctors. But in this case Accursius
straddled the issue. In one passage he preferred the majority
view; in another he came out strongly on Martinus' side, saying
that a vendor who can deliver "acts dishonestly in breaking his
19 T,he facts known about Martinus are collected ·by KANTOROWICZ, STUDIES IN THE
GLOSSATORS OF THE ROMAN LAW 86-87 (1938). His influence in developing doctrines of
unjust enrichment is discussed by DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT-A COMPARATIVE ANAL·
YSIS 68-77 (1951).
20 HAENEL, DISSENSIONES DOMINORUM 46-48, 93.94 and 597 (1834): "Quaerit enim
Martinus, si panem vendideris, te non tradente mihi mortuo fame, quod interesse
poterit praestari?" Martinus chiefly relied on D. 19.1.11. 1 and 2 which said that the
seller "should" deliver (rem ipsam praestare venditorem oportet), and Martinus argued
that oportet conveyed the notion of a "necessity."
21 HAENEL, id. at 528-530, a long discussion by Hugolinus.
22 This was suggested by Joannis Bassianus, quoted in the gloss by Accursius to
D. 19.1.1.

504

MICHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[Vol. 57

promise" and adding an appeal to the authority of the praetor,
who had said: "pacta servabo."23 During the next hundred years
the swing to Martinus became pronounced, with increasing reliance on the corrupted text from Ulpian. By the time of Bartolus and Baldus, in the fourteenth century, there was doubt no
longer: a seller of a specific asset who was able to deliver could
be compelled to do so "by military force." Pacta servanda and
Ulpian's text should be read very broadly; the use of force was
justified against anyone who detained a specific asset that he was
obligated to deliver.24
Until this conclusion was firmly established there was no particular reason for distinguishing between obligations that were
enforceable specifically and those that were not. Accursius had
noted the distinction suggested by Celsus, between obligations
"to give" and obligations "to do" but had not made much of
it.25 Baldus, about a hundred years later, stated that a person who
had promised to build a house could not be compelled to perform specifically (non cogitur praecise ad factum) because "this
would be a ki.nd of servitude."26 But it seems that the first to
square away, as Edgar Durfee would have phrased it, was Bartolus (1314-1357) whose views were to dominate the generations
that followed. Bartolus asked the question-"Why one result in
obligations to give and another in obligations to do? . . . I have
searched the gloss and it gives no answer. So far as the writers discuss this question, they can give no answers that are necessarily
conclusive, only some that appear to be somewhat persuasive."
He then quoted the reason suggested by Baldus, that enforcement of a promise to act over an extended time would involve
a kind of servitude ( quaedam species servitutis). But Bartolus then
pointed out that this was not always true, for some acts could
be accomplished briefly without any kind of servitude. So he
23 Glosses to D. 19.I.1 and Inst. 4.21.17.1. In his gloss to D. 42.1.13.1 Accursius also
indicated his support for the notion that in obligations "to give" the obligor was compelled to perform praecise.
24 Odofredus, Comm. on D. 6.1.68 (ed. 1550, Lyon), pp. 243b-244a; Cynus, Commentaria in Codicem, 266 (Frankfort, 1578), commentary on C. 4.49; Baldus, commentary
on Code 4.49 and D. 6.1.68; Bartolus, commentary on D. 19.1, No. 12.
25 In his gloss to D. 42.1.13.1 Accursius cited a number of conflicting texts on obligations "to do" and mentioned the view advanced by some jurists that in obligations "to do"
specific performance was possible if the act was one that could be performed ·by a third
person. He then concluded that in any case in obligations "to give" the obligor could
be compelled to perform.
26 BALDUS, commentary on C. 4.49.
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quoted a second reason, given by some "modern" writers, that
in obligations "to do" so much depended on performance at the
time and in the manner promised that if default occurred the
only practical remedy was an award of money damages. He described this reason as "good enough" but incapable of covering all
situations. He also quoted and rejected a third reason, given by
another author, that in obligations "to do" the promisee might
often have no interest of his own that performance might serve.
Bartolus added a fourth reason, suggested by himself, that the
promisee's interest in securing "acts" might be hard to measure,
whereas his damages through not securing a specific thing would
be certain, or at least ascertainable. He ended this phase of his
comment with the lame remark-"These could be the reasons." 2 i
After revealing thus his own mystification, he went into a long
discussion, making it clear that the crucial line was between
promises "to do" and promises "to give." Only promises "to give"
could be directly enforced, and promises ''to do" meant damages.
The authority of Bartolus was so enormous that his adoption of
this distinction, reluctant though he apparently was, made it a
familiar part of civilian doctrine thereafter. Indeed, if the texts
of the Corpus Juris were accepted at face value, this distinction
seemed to offer the only avenue of escape. The great bulk of
the classical texts, untouched by the compilers of the Corpus
Juris, spoke only of money judgments. The examples of specific
relief in late classical and post-classical sources involved mostly
some quite exceptional cases and bore the stamp of the emperor's
authority, operating extra ordinem. The great exception was the
corrupted text of Ulpian which dealt with a very standard case,
with some language cast in general terms, 28 though in substance
Justinian's compilers made him say just the opposite of what he
probably meant to say. Then there was the flat statement of
Celsus about obligations "to do," made at random and in its
27 BARTOLUs, commentary on D. 45.1.72, No. 13. In his commentary on D. 19.l.l, No.
12, Bartolus showed his awareness that the distinction between "doing" and "giving"
was artificial. He drew on grammar, and described the obligation of a seller as "partic•
ipial;" its nature was in part that of an obligation "to do," so that it was discharged by
money payment if performance was impossible, but it was also an obligation to give that
which was specifically enforceable if performance was possible, just as a participle is
both a noun and a verb. I cannot say how far this flight of fancy impressed his contemporaries.
28 It should 'be noted that the concluding sentence of D. 6.1.68, quoted above, note
15, is: "This is the general rule and applies to all cases where anything is to be restored
by decision of the iudex, whether in interdicts, or actions in rem or actions in personam."
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context unintelligible even now. But it was a flat statement: in all
obligations to do the remedy must be a money judgment. After
mature reflection and extended debate, the medieval Roman lawyers accepted this statement and summed it up in the slogan:
N emo po test praecise cogi ad factum ("no one can be compelled
specifically to act").
In his courses in Securities Edgar Durfee discussed for years
another well-known slogan: Nemo plus juris transferre potest
quam ipse habet ("no one can transfer a greater right than he
himself has"). He called it Little Nemo and in a lengthy text
discussion that is familiar still to many, he explored the truths,
half-truths and falsehoods summed up in this short sentence.* The
post-glossators' slogan on the subject of specific performance likewise contained a core of truth and through constant repetition
it came to seem like ancient wisdom. It expressed the outside
limit that students of Roman law in the late middle ages thought
was imposed by the Roman texts, despite the bias toward specific
performance that some expressed in another slogan, pacta servanda.
The slogan nemo potest praecise had many vicissitudes in
western Europe during later centuries. Its fate in France has
greatest interest, for in France it wandered into the Civil Code.

3. France
a. The Old Regime. The judicial system organized by the
French crown in the thirteenth century was subject to none of
the limitations of praetorian procedure in Roman law. The royal
courts were organized in a hierarchy-courts of first instance, intermediate courts of appeal, and high courts of appeal called
Parlements, of which there came to be thirteen located in different
regions of France. Courts of first instance were clearly empowered
to order delivery of specific land or goods involved in litigation,
to overcome resistance to such orders through direct action by
their own officers and to punish by fine and imprisonment persons
who interfered.29 Special classes of depositaries co~ld be compelled by imprisonment to surrender objects deposited with
them.80 Injunctions against trespass to land were freely awarded.81
• See p. 459 supra.-Ed.
I IMBERT, PRACIIQUE JUDICIARE, c. 64 (1620), described the procedure against defendants in such cases who had been declared to be "contumacious."
· so PAPON, ARRESis NOTABLES, XI, tit. 8, no. 2 (1622), citing a decree of the Parlement
of Paris in 1526 against a "depositaire de justice."
815 'JOURNAL DES AUDIENCES 521, reports a decree of April 4, 1705; in which the Parle29
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There was, it is true, a distinction between ordinary remedies and
those exceptional forms of "equitable" relief that required royal
dispensation, but in the course of time the distinction became
purely formal. 82 The judicial authority of the crown was vested
as a whole in royal judges, who clearly had power to use money
fines or arrest to ensure compliance with their commands.88 Included among the commands that were issued by the Parlements
were decrees that were plainly legislative in character-regulations
of the trades and professions, provisions for internal security,
prohibitions of usury, of disorderly assemblies, or of wasteful expenditures. In their role as subordinate legislatures the Parlements
asserted in the clearest terms their powers to punish with money
fine or arrest any disobedience by members of the public to whom
their orders were directed.84 Against this general background it
would have been strange if the royal courts, especially the Parlements, had recognized any insurmountable barriers to the specific
enforcement of contracts.
As to the contract to "give" (i.e., to transfer a specific asset),
French courts and writers of the intermediate period were apment of Paris affirmed a lower court decree enjoining a group of local residents from
cutting wood on land of the Seminary of Rheims, ,under penalty of :1:1000 fine or imprisonment for any violation. The case had special interest because the remedy awarded was
in effect specific performance of a contract between the Seminary and the local inhabitants, by which the latter had surrendered their right to cut wood in exchange for
cancellation of the Seminary's right to tithes.
MAYNARD, NOTABLES ET SINGULIBRES QUESTIONS DE DROIT (1751), 336, reports a decree of
the Parlement of Toulouse in 1565 forbidding assemblies on certain land "on pain of the
whip and arbitrary fine."
82 Dawson, "The Equitable Remedies of the French Chancery before 1789," FESTFUER ERNST RABEL 99 (1954).
88 PAPON, ARRESTs NOTABLES, XVIII, tit. 5, no. 42 (1622), fine of 100 francs and imprisonment until compliance ordered in 1555 against a party who refused to carry out a partition ordered by the court; XIX id., tit. 8, no. 1, Bishop of Constance in 1548 subjected to
"great fines" payable in part to the crown and in part to the other litigant for being
"disobedient and intractable toward the court," and "a gentleman of Poitou" condemned
in 1583 to pay 2000 crowns to the opposite party and to be imprisoned because of his
disobedience.
84 There were hundreds of such decrees. An example is the decree of the Parlement
of Paris in 1611 mentioned by 1 BRISSON, DICTIONNAIRE DES ARRErs 168 (1711). It forbade
the "youth" of Soissons from assembling every May, as ihad been their practice, under
a leader who was called le Prince de la Jeunesse; the decree in terms carried the death
penalty against the youth who so assembled and corporal punishment against their
parents. The series of reports known as the Journal des Audiences has numerous decrees
from the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries that purport -to regulate conduct in
a variety of ways and threaten fine, corporal punishment or imprisonment for disobedience. Jouv, .ARRESTS DE REGLEMENT (1752), is a convenient collection of regulatory
decrees of the Parlement of Paris; LA ROCHE-FLAVIN, ARRESTs NOTABLES DU PARLEMENT
DE TOULOUSE (1682) for the Parlement of Toulouse.
SCHRIIT
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parently in full agreement-if the asset was available a seller could
be forced to surrender it.30 More than this, if he contracted to convey a clear title and a defect in title was removable, he could be
forced by fine or imprisonment to remove it.36 And the remedy
was mutual, as Lord Justice Fry would have put it-i.e., a seller
of land could compel the purchaser to complete the contract by
signing the necessary papers.37 As to contracts to "do," not involving the surrender of a specific asset, a distinction was drawn
between promises that were and were not under oath. Bartolus'
conclusion as to contracts to "do" was well enough known, but,
as one reporter expressed it, in promises that had been made
under oath "an act that is possible ... must be carried out specifically and he who has obligated himself can be specifically compelled to satisfy the said obligation and cannot escape by an offer
of damages." 38
There was no inherent reason, in other words, why French
law could not have developed a rational system of contract remedies and freed itself from the hampering restrictions that the
glossators had derived from Roman law. The powers of French
courts were ample. The notion that promises under oath were
entitled to special treatment seems to have been accidental; though
suggested for promises to "do," it was ignored in promises to
"give" (i.e., to transfer specific assets).39 This kind of distinction
could have been brushed aside by an original mind, well inSu I D'EsPE!ssES, OEUVRES 41-42 (1778), citing several French authors and a decision
of the Parlement of Paris on Dec. 18, 1557; 1 BoURJON, DROIT COMMUN DE LA FRANCE
471 (1780); 1 JOURNAL DES AUDIENCES 733 (ed. 1757), decision of the Parlement of Paris
on May 28, 1658 (the same case appears in the 1667 edition of 2 JOURNAL DES AumENCES
77); 4 JOURNAL DES AUDIENCES 731 (ed. 1757), decision of Parlement of Paris on July 19, 1697.
36 PAPON, ARRESTS NOTABLES, XI, tit. 4, no. 14 (1622), reporting a decision of the
Parlement of Paris in 1542; DUMOULIN, EXTRICATIO LABYRINTHI DIVIDUI Er INDIVIDUI,
no. 28-29 (Opera Omnia, 1681, III 94-95): "tanquam falsi venditores pignoratione personae
carceribusque coercentur."
37 6 JOURNAL DES AUDIENCES, Part I, 207 (Paris, April 22, 1712).
38 CHRESTIEN, PLUSIEURS ARRESTS NOTABLES 174 (1558), citing a decree of the Parlement
of Paris of October 13, 1539, but giving, unfortunately, no details; PAPON, ARRESTS
NOTABLES, X, tit. 1, no. 3 (1622): "Par disposition de droit commun, celuy qui est oblige de
faire quelque chose, n'est precisement tenu au faict par luy promis et n'y peut estre
contraint (citing Celsus); toutesfois si telle promesse est juree, il y sera precisement contraint" (citing, without details, decrees of the Parlement of Grenoble, Sept. 12, 1460, and
of the Parlement of Paris, July 11, 1585). Papon also mentions in the same place a decree
of June 1532 where a promisor had undertaken to build a mill but when he declared it
was "impossible" to do so, he was held only for damages.
39 The decision of 1658, cited above, note 35, involved a simple promise in writing,
not under oath, and the writers cited by D'Espeisses (same note) made nothing of the
distinction.
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formed on French practice and capable of undertaking a fresh
analysis of the problem. In short, there is a villain in this story.
The villain was Pothier (1699-1772). It was from Pothier that
the draftsmen of the Code of 1804 derived their ideas on specific
performance, as well as on most of the law of obligations. Pothier
was a routine compiler of other men's ideas. His style was very
readable and gave the appearance of lucidity, but the appearance
was delusive. What he did was to give a superficial semblance of
order to the dispersed elements he brought together-classical
Roman law, glossators' doctrines and French custom of the eighteenth century. In modem France his writings still inspire immense respect. But the quality of his intelligence can be measured
by the fact that in reproducing Bartolus' distinctions he did not
show the slightest trace of the doubts that had tortured Bartolus.
Pothier drew a basic distinction between obligations "to give
a thing" and obligations "to do something." In the latter class,
the obligor could only be forced to pay damages, for "nemo potest
praecise cogi ad factum." The same was true, he said, of an obligation "not to do," with the qualification that if in breach of such
a negative obligation the obligor had done something that could
be destroyed, the promisee could be authorized to do the work of
destruction at the obligor's expense.40 The only difficulty that
Pothier felt was over the question whether a seller or lessor could
be compelled to perform by direct execution against specific property sold or leased, without violating the "rule" that nemo potest.
. . . But he concluded that this "rule" (also called a "maxim of
law") was not violated by direct execution and that the use of
force to deprive an owner of specific property was not "uncivil."
He defined the problem as one merely of construing the meaning
of nemo potest, which he treated as a binding rule. Only in one
place, among several where he discussed it, did he even attempt
an explanation of nemo itself, and this indirectly, when he said
that nemo applied to "a bodily act by the debtor's person, to
which he could not be constrained without outrage to his person
and his liberty."41 He drew no other distinction between types
or classes, between obligations that were hard to enforce and

40 l P0TIIIER, TRAITE DES OBLIGATIONS §§141, 146, 156-157, and for the suggestion
last mentioned, §158 (Oeuvres, 1824).
412, PornIER, TRArrt DU CoNTRAT DE VENTE §§68, 480 (Oeuvres, 1824); 3 TRArrt nu
CoNTRAT DE LoUAGE §66, the last-cited section containing the language quoted.
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those that were not. Above all he misrepresented the practice of
his own time.
The commissions that approved the proposed· draft of the
Civil Code of 1804 accepted Pothier's bland statement, apparently
without debate. The only statement of motives that dealt with
it was merely a paraphrase of Pothier: "No one can be constrained
to do or not to do a thing, and if it were possible such constraint
would constitute violence, which cannot be a means for enforcing
contracts." 42 In considering the reasons why the draftsmen of the
Code were so uncritical in following Pothier we must remember
the libertarian ideas that were still in circulation and the reaction
of the Revolution against arbitrary power, unregulated by rules
of law. But there was also a more specific distrust, a distrust of
judges. For the high courts of France before-I 789 were oligarchies.
Judicial offices were owned through outright sales by the crown,
were saleable by their owners and inheritable by their heirs. Possessing the large powers of legislation that have already been mentioned, irremovable and immune to external controls, the judges
were a ·symbol of privilege and a danger to the reorganized state.
Pothier's simple formulas had the virtue, if it was a virtue, of
severely restricting judicial powers. In the scramble to meet Napoleon's deadlines it is not surprising that no one paused to reconsider the implications of nemo potest praecise.
b. From 1804 to 1940. The relevant provisions of the French
Cjvil Code (they are still in effect) start with a basic distinction"every contract" has as its object either something that the obligor
has promised to give or something he has promised "to do or
not·to do" (article 1126). As to the latter type, article 1142 provides: "Every obligation to do or not to do is resolved in damages
in case of non-performance by the obligor." In the next two articles (1143 and 1144) there appears a qualification that was
suggested in part by Pothier. The promisee can be authorized
to accomplish at the defaulting promisor's expense either (1) the
destruction of anything done in violation of an obligation "not to
do" or (2) the performance of an affirmative act that the obligor
promised "to do."
As to obligations to "give" (i.e., obligations to transfer specific
42 Statement by M. Bigot-Preameneu, quoted by Meynial, "De la Sanction Civile des
Obligations de Faire ou de·Ne Pas Faire," 56 REVUE PRATIQUE DE DRorr FRANCAIS 385 at
~~~
.

.
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assets), the principle expressed, covering sales, gifts and exchanges,
is that title passes by mere agreement (articles 1136, 1138, 1583,
938, 1703). As to both land and goods, the title so acquired is
sufficient basis for an action to recover possession, with direct execution to seize the asset promised. Title to land that rests merely
on a contract of sale is somew.qat precarious, since it can be cut off
by a sale to a second purchaser (whether with or without notice)
who first records his contract. As against creditors of the seller,
however, protection is more complete; since French law has no
procedural distinction between legal and equitable remedies, the
remedy of the land contract purchaser is apparently a simple declaration of invalidity as against a seizure in execution by a creditor of the seller, at the suit of a purchaser whose contract antedated the seizure.43 It is difficult to find in French law reports.
judicial decisions that illustrate clearly the procedure employed
in other situations. The specific remedies given to buyers of either
land or goods are blanketed in under the general rules for protection of ownership. The doctrinal writers, at· least, all claim
that direct execution is available to buyers of both fand and
goods, 44 and the fact that so little litigation on the subject has
spilled into the law reports seems to lend some support for the
claim. By judicial construction, furthermore, a promise to lease
specific land, whose possession can be physically tra,nsferred by
action of court officers, is subjected to the same procedure-the
lessor can be forced to "give" by seizure of the asset. 45 It would
seem at first glance that French law had solved most of the problems of specific performance of contract in the simplest possible.
way, allowing direct execution in sales of both land or goods,
in contracts of exchange, promises of gift (when duly notarized),

43 Sem. Jur. 1948.4403 (Cass. April 10, 1948), where the seizure had occurred, as we·
would say, by foreclosure of a mortgage, where the mortgagee had -had notice of a prior
option to buy. The note by Becque gives a useful summary of the literature on this and
related questions. A general discussion of buyers' remedies in land contracts appears in
II BAUDRY-1.ACANTINERIE ET BARDE, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, 2d
ed., §364 (1900); of the recording system introduced by the law of March 23, 1855, id.,
§§368-397; and of remedies of buyers of goods, id., §§408-417.
44 7 PLANIOL ET R!PERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS, 2d ed., §77~
(1954); 4 GARSONNET ET CEZAR•BRU, TRAITE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE §6
(1913); BAUDRY·l.ACANTINERIE ET BARDE, cited in previous note. An illustrative case,
involving a buyer of movables, appears in S. 64.2.183.
45 DALLOZ, REPERTOIRE DE JURISPRUDENCE, 30, p. 294, no. I (Cass., 1853); 18 BAUDRY·
l.ACANTINERIE ET BARDE, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, 2d ed., §308
(1900).
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and promises to lease-and all this without the harassing nuisance
of an adequacy-of-alternative-remedies test.
But there remained that bothersome group of promises "to do
or not to do," which were "resolved in damages." For them too
a mode of coercion began to emerge in the decades after 1804.
The judges serving under Napoleon were men who had been
trained during the Old Regime and they were apparently not
ready to surrender the powers to command that were a prominent
feature of the old procedure. Within the first decade after 1804
there were reports of judgments rendered for fixed sums of money
to be paid unless within a specified interval litigants performed
certain acts, such as rendering an account, filing a document,
or surrendering property to a coheir. These cases did not arise
out of contract and seemed to raise no problems in interpreting
article 1142. The question raised before the high court, the Court
of Cassation, was whether these judgments could be revoked when
compliance occurred after the time limit stated; the Court
of Cassation approved such revocation, saying that ·the judgments
could be held to be merely "comminatory," i.e., merely threats."6
A full-scale discussion of the issue occurred in 1824 in a case that
again did not involve specific performance of contract but a demand by a wife, after separation from her husband, for the surrender by him of a document needed by the wife to enforce a
claim against a third party. The trial court in 1818 had ordered
the husband to surrender the document within a specified time
limit and in default of so doing to pay 10 francs a day for each day
of delay. Five years later the IO francs a day had totalled 18,000
francs. The Court of Appeal of Paris found that the wife had not
suffered substantial injury through the delay and it had some
doubt as to where the fault lay, so it cancelled the execution that
the wife had sued out to collect the judgment. The Court
of Cassation passed without comment the question whether the
lower court originally should have issued a money judgment payable in installments, and approved the action of the Court of
Appeal. The order to pay 10 francs a day was only "provisional
and comminatory," the wife should not recover ]ll.Ore than the
damages she had actually suffered, and revocation of the decree
did not offend the rules of res judicata. 47 Then in 1832 and 1834
46 8 DALLoz, JurusPRUDENCE GENERA.LE, Chose Jugee, §!l86 (1847).
47 DALLoz, id., §!l90 (Cass., Dec. 28, 1824).
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there were cases involving orders to surrender (1) goods acquired
by an agent in breach of duty and (2) a private family document
without intrinsic value. 48 After the Court of Cassation in these
cases approved the use of the same technique, French courts were
indeed off to the races, with the excitement increased by uncertainty as to who would eventually win.
The first objection raised to these solutions was that subsequent revision or cancellation of a money judgment violated rules
of res judicata. The objection gathered force in cases that began
to appear, ordering promisors to undertake affirmative acts, in
which judgments payable in installments (so much per day or
week or year) were on an external view ambiguous: they could
be merely coercive and revocable or could possibly be a final
assessment of damages if non-performance produced continuing
injury.49 To the main objection based on res judicata the answer
given was that rules of res judicata apply only to final judgments,
not to those that were intended by the issuing court to be provisional and revocable. The problem of ambiguity was solved by
declaring that in cases of doubt it was for the issuing court to
"interpret" the decree as final or merely provisional, and in
numerous decisions the Court of Cassation asserted that such
"interpretations" were in general not subject to its review. 50
The second objection raised was not so easily disposed of,
the objection that French law did not authorize penalties for the
misconduct consisting of mere disobedience of a judicial order,
especially not arbitrary penalties that were fixed at discretion.
The developing practice of assessing cumulative money fines for
disobedience therefore violated that basic idea inherited from the
Revolution-nulla poena sine lege. The objection became more

48 S. 32.1.669 (Cass., July 10, 1832), where the lower court had revoked a lump sum
judgment after defendant had complied with the order by surrendering the goods;
'!3. 34.1.129 (Cass., Jan. 29, 1834), where the court refused to quash a decree for payment
of 100 francs a day despite the fact that the lower court in the same decree had found
unenforceable the contract evidenced by the document.
49 An example was Dejardin v. Charpentier, S. 45.2.293 (Court of Appeal of Douai,
Aug. 28, 1844), where a lessee of farm land who had failed to fertilize the land was
ordered to restore it or pay 1000 francs "damages" a year for the three years remaining
of the lease period.
50 Lower court decisions holding earlier decrees to be merely "comminatory" and
subject to revocation: S. 83.1.345 Guly 25, 1885); D. 89.1.259 (Nov. 7, 1888); S. 1909.2.272
Gune 30, 1909). Lower court decisions interpreting judgments as final and therefore not
subject to revision: S. 89.1.264 Gan. 9, 1889); S. 96.1.67 Guly 3, 1893); S. 1902.1.487 (March
2, 1898); S. 1906.1.390 {April 19, 1904).
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impressive after the Court of Cassation suggested that such judgments did not need to have any relation to the plaintiff's injury,
since the defendant's "unlawful resistance becomes a more serious
wrong and it is proper, in order to overcome it, to decree a judgment in accordance with the interests involved, a proportion
which it is the function of the lower court to measure in its unlimited discretion." 51 The famous affaire de Beauffremont involved a dispute in the 1870's between two well-known members of
cafe society over custody of their children. The judgment against
the disobedient wife, Princess Bibesco, was at first 500 francs a
day, was then raised to 1,000 francs a day, and totalled at one
stage 1,000,000 francs (about $200,000 at the then existing rate
of exchange). In their opinions in this case the French courts
used language of surprising bellicosity. 52 With this and other
examples of money awards by French courts that were plainly
punitive, it became a hollow pretense to assert that these obligations were being resolved in the "damages" that were authorized
by article 1142. Although confusion persisted in many court
opinions, it became increasingly clear in the opinions of the Court
of Cassation that the astreintes~ as they were beginning to be
called, were purely threats, coercive in purpose, provisional and
revisable, and therefore exempt from review or control. The
result was a strong reaction among doctrinal writers. Some condemned the astreinte as wholly illegal. Others, while sympathizing
with the motive, insisted that if courts were to issue installment
judgments, conditioned on performance by defendants of judicial
orders, they should be confined to the plaintiff's loss through delay in performance, where such continuing loss could be proved. 53
The astreinte was already too well entrenched in court practice
to be threatened by these protests from academic sources. And
even among the academic profession the tide was somewhat turned
by an article of the well-known historian, Professor Esmein, writing
in 1903. He admitted that it was no longer possible to explain
the astreinte as a form of damages under article 1142. He defended
it nevertheless as a necessary means of reenforcing judicial author51 D. 57.1.215 (March
52 This famous affair

25, 1857), a child custody case.
~as been <liscussed .by many. Meynial, "De la Sanction Civile
des Obligations de Faire ou de Ne Pas Faire," 56 REVUE PRATIQUE DE DRorr FRANCAis
385 at 449-450 (1884), gives the essential information.
53 Meynial, cited in the preceding note, reviews the literature up to the date of his
excellent article and states his own conclusion in these terms.
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ity. He quoted some general language, though no details, from
writers under the Old Regime, asserting that courts had power
to issue commands and injunctions. His appeal to history aimed
to show that the astreinte was a revival of the historic imperium
possessed by French courts, an imperium that survived both
Revolution and Civil Code. Since this argument standing alone
could hardly be expected to impress French lawyers, he unearthed
in the Code of Civil Procedure an obscure clause (article 1036)
which authorized courts "of their own authority (meme d'office)
to pronounce injunctions, suppress writings, declare them defamatory, and order the printing and publication of their judgments." With the help of this article he asserted that "damages
employed as a means of constraint" were not penalties but merely
an expression of judicial power to issue "injunctions," the deposit
left from an ancient heritage.64
To an American reading all these discussions the remarkable
thing is that all effort was expended in finding some justification
for the issuance of threats and none on making the threats effective. In the stereotyped formulas used by the Court of Cassation
and imitated by the lower courts, it was becoming clear by 1900
that the astreinte could not be more than a means of constraint,
provisional, and necessarily revocable. This was why the amounts
could be so fantastically inflated and could even be increased if
disobedience continued. This was why an appeal did not suspend
the order: no harm was done because in the end the astreinte
would be "liquidated" and reduced to simple damages. The only
object of an astreinte was to "break" the defendant's resistance.
What if the defendant, well advised by counsel, ignored the order
and his resistance was not "broken"? The answer was clear to
any attentive reader of the orders themselves-the court would
then award damages. Wasn't the astreinte an empty threat if
it must be revoked in any event? The writers like Esmein who
defended the astreinte consistently praised its effectiveness. Why
was this? Perhaps persons trained in American law are handicapped by their long exposure to contemnors of a sturdier type.
Perhaps Frenchmen were more credulous, though they rarely
showed this in other ways.
Esmein, "L'Origine et Ia Logique de la Jurisprudence en Matiere d'Astreintes,"
TRIM. 1903, I. The quotation in the text, with the persistent confusion of damages
and "constraint," appears at the end of the article, p. 53, though certainly his main
argument aimed to distinguish sharply between the two.
M
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There was one way out-deliberate deception. If the defendant could be made to think that the award was a final judgment
for damages, he might be more ready to comply with the order.
But if the judgment was made cumulative as most of them were,
the defendant and his counsel would not be misled if his breach
of the order would not in fact cause increased damages through
the delay. This solution required above all that the sums assessed
have some relation to the plaintiff's loss; the menace would have
to be moderate in order to leave the defendant in serious doubt.
Then why undertake this unseemly deception? Why not include in the ultimate damage award an extra sum-punitive
damages for the defendant's defiance? The Court of Cassation
in some of its earlier decisions had seemed to encourage this
practice. In any case the avenue seemed open to lower courts
through the limited power of the Court of Cassation in reviewing
facts, especially findings as to the quantum of damages. But when
the Court of Cassation, in 1927, was directly presented with the
question whether damages, in effect punitive, could be granted in
cases where no compensable losses were proved, it emphatically
denied that such damages were justified under French law.55 This
solution had the approval of Professor Esmein himself, though
to an outside observer it would seem to go far to undermine the
whole system.56
A still more remarkable feature of the whole development
was the unquestioned assumption that direct coercion was inadmissible, except in the cases of enforced surrender of a specific
asset where "military force" was justified. There was, it is true,
another exception, one that seems to modern minds the least
55 D.H. 1927.274 (March 14, 1927), involving an order, under an astreinte of 50 francs
a day, to remove a monument_ erected by defendant to commemorate her son, who had
been killed in the war, on a "concession" owned jointly by plaintiff and defendant. The
court's decision placed no stress on the human appeal of the case but merely pointed
out that the lower court had not found that there was any injury whatever to the
plaintiffs and then stated that it was not enough for the lower court to say that the
astreinte had not been intended -to be "purely comminatory" since "the bare affirmation
of the intent or will of the judge" gave no legal -basis for a damage award.
56 Esmein, in the article cited above, note 54, had .been very clear (p. 52) that his
argument was not intended to justify the imposition of "penalties" not provided by law,
especially "arbitrary penalties ... which are repugnant to the principles proclaimed by
the Revolution." Other authors who reject the notion of "private penalty": 11 BAUDRY·
LACANTINERIE ET BARDE, TRAITE THiORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT ClvIL, 2d ed., §§479480 (1900); 7 PLANIOL ET R!PERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS, 2d ed., §§792795 (1954); and numerous others involved in the discussion of the eviction cases, considered below.
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admissible of all. As late as 1931 it was held, in accordance with
earlier cases, that a wife who had left her husband without legal
cause and taken shelter with her father could be forced manu
militari to return to her husband's domicile.117 But in other
obligations "to do or not to do" the courts and authors were
perfectly clear that any pressure exerted on the person of the
promisor was forbidden not only by article 1142 but by the ethos
of modern society. No distinctions were drawn between affirmative
and negative obligations, between conduct of long or short duration, between those cases in which minimum pressure would
quite certainly be effective and those in which torture was the
only alternative. For example, where the stockholders of a corporation proposed to hold a business meeting not authorized by the
corporate by-laws, a decree that authorized plaintiff to prevent
the meeting "with the help of the police commissioner if necessary" was held to be improper, since the obligation was one "riot-to do" which must be resolved in damages.118 One writer mentioned the case of an actor who insisted, without justification,
on appearing in a play and the theater owner was authorized
by the Paris trial court to call on the police to help him exclude
the over-zealous performer. Other writers were unable to find
any record of this outlandish case and were sure at least that
if it ever occurred this "illegality" would have been corrected
by an appellate court.119
The Civil Code (articles 1143 and 1144) had recognized one
other line of attack in obligations "to do" and "not to do"substituted performance by the plaintiff at defendant's expense,
1:17 S. 1932.2.14 (Court of Appeal of Chambery, Oct. 27; 1931), where the trial court
had refused to permit such measures because of their "brutality" as well as their ineffectiveness, but the court of appeal insisted that this was clearly the husband's right, based
both on "law and equity." Earlier decisions reaching the same conclusion are referred
to in the note to the case. Some authors, admitting that this was "the law," expressed
distaste: e.g., Meynial, cited above, note 52, pp. 425-427. I have found no references to
cases since 1931 that preserve this medieval practice.
68 D. 95.2.521 (Dec. 14, 1894).
~ 69 This is the comment of Garsonnet et Cesar-Bru, 4 TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE
DE PROCEDURE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE §8 (1913). Meynial, cited above, note 52, pp.
416-417, also expressed -his disapproval of the rumored decision, though Professor Meynial
was willing that public force be used to prevent the expulsion from leased premises of
a lessee by the lessor and even to overcome interference with the use of a right of way
across another's land (id. at 417-419).
A fair sample of the attitudes expressed by the authors appears in the section of
GARSONNET ET CEZAR-BRU that is cited in the preceding paragraph. They argued that
article 1142 of the Civil Code was really unnecessary anyway: "W.hat is the use of saying
that physical or moral violence will not be used to compel a debtor to perform? This
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approved by court order in advance. A judiciary persuaded of
its· mission might have made much of this authority. Could it
not have been inferred, for example, that "military force" could
be used in support of the measures specifically authorized? At
least it might be possible to use local police in preventing physical
interference by the defendant. But ·this sort of extensive interpretation did not meet the mood of the times. The lower courts
often drew back from using substituted performance at all. The
Court of Cassation supported them, declaring that substituted
performance was an exceptional mode of enforcement, and its
use rested strictly. ill' the lower courts' discretion. It was refused
not .only for the· kind of reason that might animate our courts
of equity-e.g., that the cost of performance was disproportionate
to the advantage to be, gained60-but in cases where so far as
appeared there were no moral or physical obstacles whatever.
Where.· are a fo,;v cases in French law reports in which articles
H 43 and· 1144 ·were resorted to, but most of the time the astreinte
was used. 61
Prior to 1940 French law thus shifted increasingly to the
use of the astreinte as its primary mode of enforcing promises,
outside the group of promises to "give" (sell, lease or donate)
specific assets. It might -be thought that this was a shift in the same
direction as that taken ·in classical Roman law. But the difference
was plain. Before the end of the Roman classical period the
money judgment of the praetorian system had come to include,
quite frankly, substantial awards of punitive damages against
disobedient suitors. These judgments were final, fully collectible
and payable to the successful party, despite the enrichment thus
'f?!ought ~bout. But the French astreinte was tentative, necessarily
revocable, a simple threat that faded away if it was not ambiguous enough to intimidate; any punitive element had to be
smuggled in. To the inclusion of any punitive element the thewould be at once useless, immoral, and inhumane; no one would even for a moment
consider that an obligor should be put to torture or separated from his children in order
to secure from him the execution of a judgment directing him to procure a ratification
by a· third party or the release of a mortgage, to act in a theatrical performance, to
sing in a concert, to paint a picture, to draw a map, to retire from an office that he owned
and has transferred to another."
·

60 S: 1920.2.82 (March 18, 1914); S. 1904.1.389 (Feb. 2, 1904).
617 PLANIOL ET ·RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL
(1954); 11 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET BARDE, TRAITE THEORIQUE
CIVIL, 2d ed., §§436-439 (1900).

FRANCAIS, 2d ed., §783
ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT
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orists objected strenuously, the Court of Cassation objected at
least formally, and the Court made its objection effective where
it had means to intervene. The Code language on which the results
depended was due simply to an unfortunate accident-the shallowness of Pothier's mind-but the Code language, it seems, had been
invested and surrounded with some deep-lying convictions that
no one was disposed to challenge. 62
c. Since 1940. These convictions were exposed to an unex~
pected test by events that followed World War II. The central
problem came from a severe housing shortage, aggravated by tl-ie
population movements caused by the war. The post-war governments tried to requisition housing but much of the program was
held by the courts to be illegal. Owners of residential property
secured eviction orders against occupants whose intrusion turned
out to be illegal, against wartime refugees and other hold-over.
tenants. But the administration refused to issue the necessary
documents and authorize the use of local police. Enforcement of
eviction orders was paralyzed all over France. Exasperated by the
weakness of the executive and by what they believed to be betrayal
for political advantage, the courts undertook to enforce their
own eviction orders by using the astreinte.
The obligations of hold-over tenants to vacate could seldom
arise from express promises "to do or not to do." The main object
was to protect rights of occupancy derived from ownership. But
this caused no real difficulty. The revocable, installment money
judgment, when it first appeared 140 years before, had been in
no way tied to article 1142, and in the interval astreintes had been
used in a great variety of cases-protection of trade names, orders
to remove obstructions to easements and encroachments by neighboring landowners, injunctions against nuisances, and so on. It.
had become generally available, in other words, as a device for
enforcement of tort obligations and for the protection of owner,.
ship. 63 It could even be used against the administration of the
62 This thesis is developed in a lively way by Pekelis, "Legal Techniques and Political Ideologies," 41 MICH. L. REv. 665 at 667-673 (1943). The account of the astreinte
by Brodeur, "The Injunction in French Jurisprudence," 14 TULANE L. REv. 211 (1940),
accepts the view commonly expressed by French authors at that time that the astreinte
was an effective means of coercion.
63 3 MAZEAUD, TRAIT.E THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA REsPONSABILITE C!VILE, 3d ed.,
629 (§2507-4) (1937). For example, protection of a trade name on dissolution of a joint·
venture (D. 59.1.248); injunctions against interference with rights of way (D. 87.1.176;
D. 1900.1.167; D. 1921.1.195; Sem. Jur. 1941.II.1641); order to restore a right of way by
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state itself to compel the perfomiance of their duties by public
officers.64 It was therefore no great innovation to use it now to
assist an owner in recovering possession after the government had
defaulted, through timidity or favoritism, in providing basic protection to rights of ownership. 6lS
The crisis to some seemed great enough to threaten the legal
order itself. The academic profession rallied to support the courts.
Lingering doubts as to whether the astreinte was "legal" were resolved by all, except for two hardy spirits who still insisted that it
was "illegal" despite the fact that the courts had used it for more
than a century. 66 The view of Esmein now prevailed. No one seriously believed that the power to issue "injunctions," tucked away
in the Code of Civil Procedure, had been originally intended to
convey very much more than the power to maintain courtroom
order. But to some this language seemed quite good enough.67
Others described the astreinte as a product of a "decisional custom" (coutume jurisprudentielle) or simply a product of necessity.
In any case, it plainly offered the only hope of preserving that respect for judicial authority that the weakness of the executive had
undermined.
erecting .a covered passage (D. 89.1.259); order to remove a building encroachment (S.
1948.2.109); order to level land after subsidence through mining operations (Gaz. Pal.
1941.1.567); order to install an electric motor in defendant's phonograph so as not to
interfere with plaintiff's radio reception (Gaz. Pal. 1930.1.609). Still more interesting
were decrees that ordered specific reparation: •by a depositary (the Bank of France) that
lost <:ertificates of stock through failure to take precautions during the German advance
into France {Gaz. Pal: 1945.2.75), and by automobile repairmen through whose negligence
tires or wheels were stolen from automobiles in their custody (S. 1937.1.141; Gaz. Pal.
1945.2.65; D. 1947.379).
64 3 MAZEAUD,

cited in previous note, 628 (§2507-3); Kayser, "L'Astreinte Judiciaire

et la Responsabilite Civile," R.EvUE TRIM., 1953, 209 at 222-223.
65 The literature of the late 1940's, some of which is cited below, is full of denunciations by legal writers of the administration for failure to give support in the enforcement
of eviction orders. The language of the Tribunal Civil of Sables d'Olonne was much
quoted: "It is harrowing to have to assert that the provisions ordering judgments to be
put into execution are frustrated every day by the default or ill will (mauvais vouloir)
of the prefectoral administration which thus disturbs instead of ensuring the public order
that is placed in its charge." D. 1948.34 (Nov. 24, 1947).
66 2 COLIN ET CAPrrANT, COURS ELEMENTAIRE DE DRorr CIVIL FRANCAIS, 10th ed.,
134-135 (1948).
67 Vizioz in Sem. Jur. 1948.689, after pointing out that article 1036 of the Code of
Civil Procedure had almost certainly not been intended to give general powers to issue
injunctive orders: "But this objection does not deserve to be supported. Being respectful
of the law even in their boldest creations, French courts by instinct search for a legal
provision behind which they can find shelter. Why should they not use article 1036,
whose -text is sufficient in itself? It is ·hardly necessary to divine the intention of its
draftsmen, which remains an enigma."

1959]

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

521

It was therefore a still greater shock to discover that the whole
technique was most ineffective when needed most. "Evicted" tenants all over France remained in possession, secure in the knowledge that in the end the owner could recover no more than his
provable damages. The more the courts expressed their exasperation by piling the money awards higher and higher, the more
secure the tenants could be. So trial courts shifted to another line,
declaring that their money awards were final judgments for
damages-"astreintes non-comminatories." 68 At this point the
legislature intervened, siding with the executive, and passed the
statute of July 21, 1949, which declared that every astreinte
attached to an order for eviction from housing was necessarily
merely "comminatory" and must be reduced to simple damages
after the tenant had finally left. 69 This reaffirmation of classical
theory compounded the problem. Was there anything else that
could be done?
One possibility was to issue execution to collect the astreinte,
seizing goods or garnishing wages on what we would call mesne
process, in order to exert immediate pressure. The objection of
course was that under the classical theory the astreinte was so
tentative and provisional as to provide no basis for execution. The
Court of Cassation had so declared as early as 1860.70 There was
another objection-that many of the eviction orders were issued
initially in interlocutory proceedings ( en refere), and the Court
of Cassation had held in 1898 that an astreinte could not be issued
at this early stage. In 1950 the Court of Cassation changed its
mind on this particular issue.71 Well before that time under various pretexts the lower courts had begun to hold that execution
could issue at once to collect astreintes. This meant that the goods
or wages thus collected must be impounded to await the final outcome, or if they were turned over to the judgment creditor, he
68 Sero. Jur. 1946.II.3079
69 7 PLANIOL Er Ril'ERT,

(March 5, 1946); D. 1948.135 (Nov. 7, 1947).
TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL F°RANCAIS, 2d ed., §795

quater (1954).
70 D. 61.1.462 (Dec. 31, 1860). In the famous case of DeBauffremont v. Princess
Bi.besco a trial court had issued an order sequestering the property of the nomadic
Princess, but this was held by the Court of Appeal of Paris to be "an improper invasion
of property rights." D. 78.2.125. In some other cases of this type seizure of the wife's
property has been authorized as an exercise of the husband's powers of administration
over his wife's property.
71 D. 1950.377 (Cass., March 28, 1950), the chief reason given being, again, that since
the astreinte was "provisional" and "always subject to revision," no harm could be done
in issuing such an order in advance of trial on the merits.
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would become accountable for any excess received when the judgment was finally "liquidated." But in the meantime, the defendant
could be put under pressure if he had some assets that could be
found. Though this procedure has been very much used, it is
still an open question whether the Court of Cassation will approve it. 72
The second possibility was the one that had already been so
much discussed-why not punitive damages? If awarded to the
judgment plaintiff they would, it is true, enrich him. Their
amount could not readily be fixed by law or measured by some
objective standard, so they would in that sense be "arbitrary." Almost all the writers agreed that in practice, where some damages
were proved, the judges in their final "liquidation" threw in something extra against disobedient defendants. Sometimes this was
called a "moral prejudice" that the plaintiffs had suffered through
seeing court decrees flouted. Yet almost all the writers were agreed
-the peine privee was intolerable. Whatever money penalties
might be imposed must be disguised under the name of damagesthough the damages might be "rigorously" assessed.78 And the
decisions since 1950 come to about the same result. The Court of
Cassation has repeatedly said that an award of damages must be
"justified." This means that if no evidence of substantial loss to
the plaintiff appears in the record, the astreinte though called final

72 Lower court decisions employing immediate execution appear in Gaz. Pal.
1947.I.221 (April 2, 1947); S. 1950.2.94 Gan. 19, 1950); Gaz. Pal. 1949.II.409 (Oct. 27, 1949)
and 1950.I.283 (March 14, 1950). As the notes to some of these cases indicate, there were
contrary decisions in some lower courts and the Court of Cassation had rejected this
possibility in some fairly recent decisions. In a sober review of the subject in the Sem.
Jur. 1951, Doctrine, 910, II, Professor Frejaville concluded that any form of execution,
whether final (conditionally final) or merely "conservatory," is improper. This seems to
be the view of 3 MAZEAUD, R.EsPONSABILITE CIVILE, 3d ed., 623 (§2501) (1937), but 7 PLANIOL
ET RIPERT, TRAIT:£ PRATIQUE, 2d ed., §795 ter (1954), could only conclude that opinions
were "divided." The contrary view was vigorously urged by Savatier, D. 1951. Chron. 10.
Kayser in REVUE TRIM., 1953, 209 at 228-230, concluded that "final" execution is improper
but "conservatory" execution may be used.
78 Frejaville in D. 1948.35 and Sem. Jur. 1951. Doctrine 910, with the further suggestion that the "rigorous" assessment of damages was justified by returning to the notion
that civil liability has a "repressive" as well as compensatory function (if this does not
mean disguised punishment, I misunderstand his argument). Kayser, REVUE TRIM., 1953,
209 at 243-244, concluded that the astreinte is not and cannot ,be a peine privee, though
in fact the courts do include "un element de peine privee" in their final award of damages
when the defendant's resistance "aggravates his initial fault"; apparently the argument
is that the courts should be blamed for this, not the astreinte itself. 7 Pr.ANIOL ET Rl:PERT,
TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS, 2d ed., §§793-795 bis (1954) likewise express
their disapproval of the peine privee though admitting that peines creep in.
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must be reversed. 74 It also means that if the lower court is candid
and discloses that some part of the money awarded exceeds the
loss, the decree must likewise be reversed. 75 Yet the Court of Cassation has refused to reverse in several cases where some substantial damages were shown but the totals awarded were suspiciously
large. 76 As clearly as language can do it, the Court of Cassation has
announced that it will not tolerate in civil judgments any "private
penalty" that the Court itself has the means to detect. The lower
courts keep trying, adding various forms of punitive damages
despite the high court's disapproval. We are so unused to this
freedom of subordinate judges to disagree with their appellate
superiors, though in the French system this freedom is conceded.
We would call them insubordinate. But if it is a case of insubordination, the lower courts have had but little help from the
academic profession. So far as I have ascertained, the only ones
that urge them on are those independent gentlemen, the brothers
Mazeaud.77
So we return to the question-if punitive damages are inadmissible, why not assess real penalties, money fines payable, not to
the private party but to the state as punishment? This suggestion
has indeed been made, though with no great enthusiasm.78 The
draftsmen of a revised Code of Civil Procedure included such a
proposal in an early draft. It is most doubtful whether it will
ever be adopted. A critic of this proposal, writing in 1953, expressed the view that may well prevail-penalties, no matter to
whom they are paid, are arbitrary and cannot be subjected to any
kind of definite rule. "It does not seem advisable to cause the state
thus to intervene between obligee and obligor," when "a simple
measure of constraint"-the astreinte-so readily assures the obIigor's performance.79 Another thoughtful writer in 1951 ex-

74 Sem. Jur. 1951.2.6089 (Nov. 30, 1950); S. 1953.1.196 (Feb. 27, 1953); Bul. des Arrets
de Ia Cour de Gassation, 1957.4.363 (May 9, 1957).
75 Bul. des Arrets de Ia Gour de Gassation, 1955.2.286 (Oct. 27, 1955).
76 Bul. de5 Arrets de la Gour de Gassation, 1955.1.50 (Feb. 2, 1955); id., 1956.4.125
(Feb. 17, 1956, despite the slip made by the lower court in saying part of the sum awarded
was for the "bad faith" of the defendant); id., 1956.2.213 Gune 7, 1956).
77 The only encouragement I have found -has come from the brothers Mazeaud, who
in the REVUE TRIM., 1954, 107 applauded a court of appeal which declared the measure
of damages should be defendant's fault, not plaintiff's loss, despite a plain decision to
the contrary by the Court of Cassation the previous year.
78 Esmein, Gaz. Pal. 1941.1.81 and 1949.2. Doctrine, 15. The note in Sem. Jur.
1958.II.10906 cites M. Pierre Mazeaud as another who approves this suggestion.
79 Kayser, REVUE TRIM., 1953, 209 at 243-244.
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pressed the view that the responsibilities cast on the astreinte had
become an overload. In the earlier period when the astreinte was
less used, he said, it was a valuable means of intimidation. But by
1951 the secret was out; litigants knew or were told by their lawyers that the astreinte was not a "very serious" threat. The writer
described the situation as a "crisis of the astreinte," whose use had
come to undermine the judicial prestige that it had been intended
to protect. What was the remedy he proposed-to confer on courts
a power to arrest or fine? Not at all. His remedy essentially was
to use the astreinte less and when it was used to keep the sums
down. 80
So what is the French law of specific performance? As to one
class of promises-to transfer land or goods that can be reached
by a bailiff-specific relief is available, it seems, to any promisee
who wants it if rights of third parties have not intervened. This
is a large percentage of the potentially enforceable promises, and
its importance should not be minimized. Outside this group, for
promises in general, the authors have been saying for more than
a century that the "principle" is always specific performance. The
only reservation that is usually admitted is for that very rare case
where the performance promised involves a high degree of personal creativity-the usual illustration is the artist who promised
to paint a picture. That French law is committed "in principle"
to specific performance was asserted in the nineteenth century by
those very persons who disapproved of the astreinte. Still more is
it asserted by modern authors who accept the astreinte and praise
it.81 Some recent authors have advanced an even broader principle,
that specific reparation where feasible must be given also in tort
ohligations-e.g., the driver who negligently injures another's car
must be ordered to repair it-and recent decisions of the Court of
Cassation are reaching out in this direction.82 And the means for
realizing the "principle"? Almost exclusively, the astreinte. An
outside observer will be excused, I hope, for describing such a

SOFrejaville, "La Valeur Pratique de l'Astreinte," Sem. Jur. 1951. Doctrine. 910.
8124 DEMOL01,mE, CoURS DE CoDE NAPOLEON §§488-497 (1870); Meynial, "De la
Sanction Civile des Obligations de Faire ou de ne Pas Faire," 56 REvUE PRATIQUE DE
DROIT FRANCAIS 398ft (1884); 4 GARSONNET ET CEZAR-BRU, TRArra THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE
DE PROCEDURE §10 (1913); 7 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS, 2d ed., §776 {1954).
82 3 MAZEAUD, TRAITE DE LA REsPONSABILITE CIVILE, 4th ed., §§2303-2308 (~47), and
cases cited above, note 63.
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principle as almost wholly meaningless where the astreinte is the
only means employed for its realization.

4. Germany
The practice and the attitudes current in French law have been
described at such length because they differ so completely from
those familiar to us. When we move across the boundary to Germany, the world of ideas does not seem so topsy-turvy. On the contrary, the modern German solutions differ from our own chiefly in
being more tightly organized and more carefully thought through.
The contrast between the French and the German treatment of
specific performance is one among many demonstrations of the
great differences between the "civil law" systems. Despite their
long exposure to ideas derived from Roman law, each of the "civil
law" systems is the product of independent, conscious choices.
Each has drawn important values and objectives from the society
it purports to regulate.
Indeed through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Germany was far more exposed to a revised and modernized Roman
law than France had ever been. The large-scale reception of Roman law, beginning in the German states in the sixteenth century,
had certainly familiarized German lawyers with the distinction
between "doing" and "giving." Their main struggle was to preserve specific relief in the contract of sale. Though some purists
disagreed, most of the writers concluded, and generally the courts
agreed, that the buyer could have specific performance if the asset
could be reached by physical seizure. 83 But it was taken for granted
that obligations "to do" were in general not specifically enforceable. Express legislation in some of the German states provided
some specific remedies that were available for enforcement of contracts, but the influence of the nineteenth century Pandectists,
with their better understanding of the classical texts, tended if anything to exaggerate the influence of classical Roman law and to
increase reliance on damage remedies. 84
Perhaps Germany was fortunate in approaching the whole
260 (1571, Lyons); 1 FACHINAEUS, CONTROVERSIAE !URIS, ch. 8
HUBER, PRAELECTIONES !URIS CIVILIS, comm. on D. 19.1.1, no. 5 (Leipzig, 1707);
VJNNIUS, COMM. ON INSTITUTES, III, tit. 24 (ed. 1676). References to opposing views are
collected :by ZIEBARTH, DIE REALEXECUTION UND DIE OBLIGATION §16 (1866).
84 Some of the extreme views advanced in his own time are described, and also combatted, by Ihering in his RECHTSGUTACHTEN, JHERINGS JAHRBUCH, p. l (1880).
83 ZASIUS, DE AcrIONIBUS

(ed. 1679);
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problem initially as a problem of procedure. The effort to prepare a national Code of Civil Procedure began in the 1860's under
the North German Confederation. Many drafts were exchanged,
some of which omitted all reference to the enforcement of judgments ordering acts or abstentions. A draft that included provisions on the subject was considered by the drafting commission
that met in the spring of 1870. The commission unanimously
agreed that "delegable" acts (i.e., acts performable by third persons) could be ordered performed by the plaintiff himself, with
the cost charged to the defendant in the manner provided by the
French Civil Code. It was also agreed that personal arrest of the
judgment defendant was improper in the case of delegable acts,
this being considered a necessary inference from a statute passed
two years before (in 1868) forbidding imprisonment for debt.
The question then raised was whether arrest or fine could be used
to compel acts or abstentions that could not be delegated to others.
The commission was divided, but a majority agreed to the proposition that "it is intolerable and inconsistent with the basic principles of the modern law of obligations that an obligor without
property should be able to defeat the execution of a judgment
merely through his own disobedience.''. It was also pointed out that
with some acts, if the obligor's own personal performance could
not be secured, the obligation would be wholly defeated. 85 The
commission's official statement of motives, published in 1872,
pointed out that the draftsmen had made every effort to limit
the use of fine or arrest to cases in which enforcement could not
be accomplished by any other means, and that if the object was
to extract money from the defendant, arrest or fine could not
be used since the object was not to "punish insolvency." In
support of its conclusiQns the commission referred to legislation of the various German states that had come to admit fine
and arrest as sanctions in particular cases. But the basic argument, again, was that a judgment defendant should not be allowed,
in violation of a court order, to render his obligation "illusory"
through his insolvency or through inability to measure the loss
caused by his breach of duty. 86 When a committee of the Reich-

85 PROTOKOLLE DER KOMMISSTON ZUR AUSARBEITUNG DES ENTWURFS EINER CIVILPROZESSORD•
NUNG FUER DIE STAATEN DES NORDDEUTSCHEN BUNDES,

320th and 321st meetings, pp. 2057-2064

(1870).
86 BEGRUENDUNG DES _ENTWURFS EINER DEUTSCHEN CIVILPROZESSORDNUNG

573-577 (1872).
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stag then reviewed these issues, in 1875, one deputy argued
strongly for the adoption of the French Code article 1142, claiming that abrogation of imprisonment for debt necessarily meant
that "arrest as a means for enforcing civil claims was excluded."
But he was told by a government spokesman that this rule of
French law, originally derived from Roman law, "does not correspond to the German legal conscience." Another deputy spoke up
and said: "Much as he and the members of his party desire to
protect the freedom of the citizen, . . . personal freedom does not
include a right to commit the wrong of violating wilfully the
legally operative judgment of a court." 87 The proposed draft was
then adopted by the parliamentary commission, and later by the
Reichstag. The new Code of Civil Procedure was promulgated
on January 30, 1877, with an effective date of October 1, 1879.
It certainly could not be thought that the decisions thereby
reached, in discussions lasting more than ten years, were made
hastily, or without full awareness of their larger implications.
The Code of Civil Procedure, in its provisions for execution of
judgments, defines a series of categories that are conceived as
mutually exclusive. One category is the judgment ordering surrender of a specific asset-movable goods, an immovable (land), or
a ship-and here the procedure prescribed is direct execution
through seizure by a court officer. 88 A second category is the judgment ordering "delegable" acts, which can be performed by third
persons; the remedy here is an order authorizing the plaintiff to
have the act performed at defendant's expense (article 888). A
third category is the judgment ordering a "declaration of will"e.g., a conveyance of title to land-where the judgment itself is
self-executing (articles 894-896). For present purposes the most
interesting category is the judgment ordering an act that cannot
be performed by a third person and that "depends exclusively on
the will" of the defendant; here the remedy is body arrest or a
money fine, limited originally to 1500 marks but since 1924 unlimited (article 889). Associated with this main category of nondelegable acts is the judgment ordering the defendant "not to do,"
i.e., where the obligation is "to refrain from acting or to permit
the performance of an act"; here the sanction is again arrest, not
413-414 (1875).
ZPO, articles 883 and 886, with a similar provision in article 884 for "a definite
quantity of fungible property or documentary securities."
87 PROTOKOLLE DER KOMMISSION DES REICHSTAGS
88
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to exceed two years, or a money fine originally limited to 1500
marks but since 1924 unlimited (article 890). To make these sanctions perfectly explicit, it is then provided that if the judgment
defendant resists the performance of any act that he is bound to
permit (whether "delegable" or not), court officials can call on the
police or the army, if the army is needed (article 892, plus articles
758 and 759). Finally there was added a set of provisions for
temporary injunctions, subjected to the same basic tests as to the
sanctions to be used, but including the power to award sequestration of property (articles 935-938).
That the various categories of judgments were meant to be
mutually exclusive appears expressly in two articles of the Code.89
It also appears by clear implication from the provision for acts
that "depend exclusively on the defendant's will." If the result
aimed at by the court's order can be achieved by direct execution
against specific assets, through a self-executing decree, or by act
of the plaintiff or a third party, then it does not depend "exclusively" on the defendant's will and fine or arrest are not authorized. This clause has likewise been construed to exclude direct
coercion by fine or arrest where external obstacles make performance impossible or very difficult; the act or acts then do not depend
"exclusively" on the defendant since they are beyond his control.90
It is primarily through this key clause that the draftsmen gave
effect to thefr declared object of confining direct coercion to the
narrowest possible compass, making it a last resort. It should be
noted also that an express provision of article 888 excluded the
use of fine or arrest in orders to enter marriage contracts, orders for
restitution of conjugal rights and orders for the performance of
services under a personal service contract.
Armed with powers so broadly expressed, German courts in
the period between 1879 and 1900 proceeded to give specific
relief in cases where the substantive law was at least debatable.
Particularly interesting were two cases arising from the Rhineland, where the French Code was still in effect. The Reichsgericht,
the highest German Court of Appeal, skirted the road-block of
the French Code article 1142 and issued injunctions against (1)
89 ZPO, article 887 on "delegable" acts says in 1[3: "The above provisions have no
application to forced execution which aims to accomplish the surrender or production of
tangible property." Article 888a excludes fine or arrest and also substituted performance
in judgments for damages.
90 Seufferts Archiv, 51, no. 243 and 306 (1895); 52, no. 279 (1896); 60, no. 113 (1904).
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unfair competition and (2) nuisance by an adjoining landowner.
The Reichsgericht's argument was that since the interests of the
plaintiffs were given legal protection against these types of intentional injury, the court must infer that the protection was meant
to be effective, i.e., something more than money damages. 91 Perhaps similar steps would have been taken in the enforcement of
express promises. They proved to be unnecessary, for the Civil
Code, adopted in 1897 with an effective date of January 1, 1900,
set all doubts at rest. The draftsmen of the Civil Code in the
clearest terms declared in their statement of motives the belief that
specific enforcement of promises was the normal and preferred
procedure. The means had already been supplied by the Code of
Civil Procedure, regulating means of enforcement after judgments had been entered.
The basic principle of specific enforcement, applicable to
both contract and tort obligations, was expressed in the Civil
Code by article 241:
"By virtue of an obligation the obligee is entitled to demand performance from the obligor. The performance may
also consist of an abstention."
So far was this principle carried that damages were made to appear
exceptional and had to be specifically authorized in cases of "injury to a person or damage to a thing" (article 249), in cases where
specific relief was "impossible or insufficient to compensate" the
obligee (article 251), and in cases where the injured party gave
formal notice that he demanded money damages and fixed a
reasonable time in which the performance due might be rendered
(articles 250, 283, and 326). There was also a fourth type of case
in which the obligor was allowed, by way of privilege, to substitute money compensation-i.e., where the performance called for
could be accomplished only 1vith "disproportionate expenditure"
(article 251, para. 2).
Limitations of space make it impossible to describe here in
detail the solutions worked out by the courts under these general
provisions. But one main point should be noted. The Code sets
limitations on resort to damage remedies in contract cases, requiring at least a formal notice mth demand for performance and in
some cases a formal court order fixing a time limit for rendition of
91

25 RGZ 347 (1890) and 38 RGZ 379 (1897).
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the promised performance. But despite such formal limitations the
damage remedy is in fact resorted to, by the choice of litigants, in
a high percentage of cases, especially in sales of goods and other
commercial transactions that are standard subjec~ of damage
actions with us. Another main point, however, is that in contract
cases where specific enforcement is desired for any reason by the
promisee, the courts have not claimed for themselves a discretion
to refuse specific relief that is appropriate and possible. Unlike
French courts, they have not felt free to refuse substituted performance, to be carried out by the plaintiff at defendant's expense
where this solution is practicable. Unlike our own equity courts,
German courts in general have not asserted a discretionary power
to refuse specific performance, through a morality too delicate
and refined to satisfy the more robust tests used in damage
actions. The double standard of morality that is so characteristic
of our system simply does not exist in German law. This is
mainly because, in ways that are too complex and pervasive to
be documented here, specific performance, not the damage remedy, is conceived as the normal recourse. In short, the legislative
mandate is accepted and applied. When a judgment has been
rendered and the case has reached the stage of execution-a stage
that is formally distinct from the pre-judgment stage-the court
entrusted with execution will normally be ready, without hesitation, to order specific enforcement when requested by the judgment plaintiff. The main reservations are for cases where specific
relief is impossible, would involve disproportionate cost, would
introduce compulsion into close personal relationships or compel
the expression of special forms of artistic or intellectual creativity.
Presumably German courts, like French courts and our own,
would not affirmatively order painters to paint pictures or singers
to sing.92
Difficulties have of course appeared, as they were bound to do
under a system in which the choice of sanctions was so closely con-

921 STEIN-JONAS, KOMMENTAR ZUR Z.P.O., art. 888. Actually reported cases of the
latter type are hard to find. In a case in 1897 (39 RGZ 420) the Reichsgericht dealt with
the question whether a chemist who had invented a process for manufacturing mirrors
could be forced through arrest or fine under article 888 to turn over his invention. Since
the invention had been fully worked out and written down in a document, the court
held it to be proper to use direct coercion to compel surrender of the document. The
court made it clear by implication that the inventor would not have been ordered to
invent, though the Code of Civil Procedure itself was not too helpful on this issue.
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trolled. What should be done, for example, with an order to surrender a child? Should the child be considered "movable goods"?
Enforced surrender of the child could be accomplished by a third
person, but if emotional factors (especially the child's emotions)
could be taken into account, it might be better to threaten the
adult who wrongfully detained him and to say, as some decisions
did, that performance depended "exclusively" on the defendant's
will.93 Similarly, what if the object was to compel surrender of
land or goods that were located in a foreign country where German court officers had no official status; should practical difficulties of execution override the Code classifications and permit resort to money fines, collectible perhaps against the defendant's
local assets?94 There were various other situations where the choice
of appropriate modes of execution was hampered by the efforts of
Code draftsmen to narrow the range of judicial discretion, by constructing categories that were sharply defined and mutually exclusive. 95 A severe test of the system came in the inflation that
occurred during and after World War II. Shortages of goods, outside the sectors that were strictly controlled by requisitioning and
rationing, brought a shift to barter as a mode of exchange; money
became almost worthless and damage judgments illusory. Most of
the cases involved tort claims for injury to or loss of movable
property and therefore do not concern us now. It is interesting to
note, however, that the principle of specific reparation was carried so far that many courts leaped over the barriers between the
various modes of execution that were erected by the Code of Civil
Procedure. They ordered defendants, sometimes under threats of
fine or imprisonment, to find and deliver substitutes for cars,
horses, bicycles, turkeys, watches and other goods that had been
wrongfully taken or destroyed. 96 Under the stress of a national

93 Using the "movable goods" clause: Juristische Wochenschrift, 1923, 849; Seufferts
Archiv, 59, no. 140. Seufferts Archiv, 38, no. 289 had held the other way.
Using the "delegable act" clause (article 887, ZPO): Seufferts Archiv, 38, no. 195.
Using money fines under article 888 because of the practical obstacles in the other
solutions: Juristische Wochenschrift, 1929, 869, and 1934, 50.
9¼ The Reichsgericht in 1902 held that direct execution was the only permissible
recourse to reach goods located in Riga and thus in effect refused execution. Juristische
Wochenschrift, 1902, 396. But a lower court in 1922, confronted with a similar problem, was willing to hold that the transfer of an asset located abroad depended "exclusively" on the defendant's will. Juristische Wochenschrift, 1922, 400.
95 E.g., Juristische Wochenschrift, 1916, 656 and 690; RGZ, 55, p. 58; RGZ, 31, p. 412;
Juristische Wochenschrift, 1923, 1042.
96 An extensive literature developed and numerous decisions were rendered prior to
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economic CTISis, judicial discretion was reasserted in adapting
means to attain the end, specific enforcement, on which all agreed.

5. Implications for American Law
The solutions adopted in French and German law have·some
implications for us. Even more significant than the particular solutions are the attitudes that have produced them.
Surely French and German experience confirm what we already knew, that the adequacy-of-alternative-remedies test is an
unnecessary and irksome restriction on specific performance. The
adequacy test has a function, as will be suggested, but as framed
and usually applied it is arbitrary and irrational. It fades out completely in contracts for the sale of land, through the artificial but
:useful "presumption" that it is impossible to value interests in
land. It is a severe limitation in sales of other things than land.
Why not, as in both French and German law, give specific performance as to any physical object that can be found and is reachable by direct execution? It is true that wherever speed is a factor
and markets reasonably organized, promisees will not often ask for
it, as has proved true in Germany (and I think also in France). But
why not leave this to the promisee's choice? The adequacy test is
so much a part of our historical tradition that to get rid of it
entirely in specific performance cases will clearly require express
legislation. The mild provision of the Uniform Sales Act, applicable to buyer's suit, has gotten us nowhere, and the Uniform
Commercial Code will probably make it worse. 97 As to sellers'
actions the choice is between different kinds of money judgment remedies, and the arguments for specific performance center
on the risks and uncertainties of self-help measures that are
usually presupposed in damage actions. These arguments are
persuasive, but our uniform legislation, from Sales Act through
_to Commercial Code, has progressively restricted the seller's action
for the price, for reasons that seem unpersuasive.98

the stabili:mtion achieved in 1948. Bruns in the SUED-DEUfSCHE JURISTEN ZEITUNG, 1947, 302
described the economic background. Illustrative cases appear in the MoNATSCHRIFr FUER
DEUfSCHES RECHT, 1947, 101 and 102 and the SUED-DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 1946, 179 and 180;
1948, 195.
97 Uniform Sales Act, §68, discussed in 100 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 769 (1952); Uniform
Commercial Code, §2-716, despite the exhortations of the official comment.
98 Uniform Sales Act, §63; Uniform Commercial Code, §2-709.
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Outside the area of promises to "give," where direct execution
is appropriate and feasible, different considerations arise. Our
own solution is an uneasy compromise. Damages of course are the
only remedy in a large percentage of cases, even though the difficulties of evaluation and proof may be serious. When these difficulties become too great, under tests that are highly variable, the
case can move into equity. Then discretion rules. Not only the
initial decision whether or not to grant specific performance, and
on what terms, but the choice and the severity of the sanctions
imposed are all remitted to the judge's discretion. Particularly
after studying the provisions of German law one is struck with
our own failure to analyze and organize our system of sanctions.
Instead of a carefully adjusted scale in which each mode of enforcement is assigned to its special task, we have almost no rules
at all to regulate the choice or severity of sanctions. In particular,
the historic confusion between civil and criminal contempt remains a confusion and very few of our courts have even made a
serious effort to disentangle it.
The real contrast in practices and attitudes, of course, is not
with Germany but rather with France. To a person trained in
American law it seems hard to believe that so large a percentage
of French judicial decisions should be left without effective sanction. Even the alarming experience with the post-war eviction
cases has apparently not brought a wide-spread demand for change,
through new legislation or otherwise. It is true that French lawyers have been inhibited mainly by a principle of legality-nulla
poena sine lege-that we likewise accept. But we have taken it for
granted, without much conscious thought, that the penalties for
disobeying judges' commands were exempt from this principle,
since contempt of court is a special offense-not quite a crime
though for certain purposes treated as though it were a crime.
This view has survived the abolition of imprisonment for debt,
occurring in most states in the nineteenth century. With a few
exceptions (decrees ordering payment of simple money debts),
equity orders can be enforced by imprisonment despite the constitutional prohibitions. This is so plain it is seldom discussed,
though the problem seems to be worth discussion. Is there not
some analogy?
The common law treatment of contempt of court, contrasting
so greatly with French practices, has led an Italian writer to
ascribe the differences to racial factors. In his view the idea of con-
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tempt was a "Germanic" idea. For this there is some historical
basis, at least in the sense that it first appeared in the early middle
ages as an undifferentiated notion of disobedience, to rulers who
were mostly Germanic. His argument is that this idea, with its desirable German attributes, reached Italy through the Lombards,
and returned through Italianized canon law to England, where it
was preserved and expanded by the national character of the
English-their admirable balance between discipline and freedom.
He claimed that somehow these migratory ideas went around or
over or under France, which had never conferred enforcement
powers on its courts at any stage.99 Quite apart from the exaggerations of the racial theory, I have tried to argue that there is nothing congenital about Frenchmen that makes them prefer weakness
or paralysis of judicial authority. Fine and arrest were widely used
to enforce court orders in France under the Old Regime, and the
reaction of the Revolution against arbitrary penalties must in part
be explained by the great and irresponsible power of French
courts before 1789. I have tried to pin the fault on Pothier, who
slavishly copied a slogan that had originated in the late middle
ages through an understandable misreading of Roman texts.
Yet who can doubt that in the basic choices made, especially
those made in modern times, there were some factors of social
psychology? The Germans in the 1870's who drafted and adopted
the Code of Civil Procedure were consciously rejecting the procedural limitations of classical Roman law. They also made a
conscious choice, with real discrimination, between the claims on
behalf of individual freedom that were strongly asserted before
them and the claims of society to an essential kind of obedience.
Not only to maintain judicial authority but to protect private
rights conferred by law and established after fair hearing, penalties, they concluded, were justified-even the severest penalty,
personal arrest, which had already been eliminated for other
breaches of civil duty. There is no sign that they ever considered
the Anglo-American version of an adequacy test, which reflected
merely the working compromise between competing tribunals
that historical accident had created. The adequacy (or inadequacy)
test that the German draftsmen adopted instead is one that seems
99 Dr Rossr, IL CONTEMPT OF COURT E LA SPECIFIC PERFOfil\lANCE NEL DIRITTO INGLESE
ZEITSCHRIFT FUER

179-194, 248-258 (1934), of which an abbreviated version appears in 51
VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 233 (1937).
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far more rational-body arrest and money fines shall be used as
modes of coercion only when all other measures will be inadequate.
At the very time that these decisions were being made in Germany, French courts were struggling to escape the strait jacket of
the Code, but French authors were urging in the most extreme
form the principles of individualism.100 In the end, in the twentieth century, the impulse shown by French courts to use the
astreinte as a form of punitive damages was held in check and the
logic of the authors very largely prevailed-as fully as the Court
of Cassation with its limited powers could make its views effective.
Did all this happen because of a distrust of judges,. inherited from
the eighteenth century ancl translated to the level of unconscious
belief? Was it because the claims of self-assertion against external
authority had really been accepted in French society as fully as
some of the authors seemed to say? Or was it because lawyers'
minds were imprisoned by lawyers' doctrines, constructed to explain and justify the rules of the Civil Code? All of these factors
may have been at work, but my own emphasis would fall on the
last.
But before we conclude that the societies molded by the common law have special and inherent capacities for social discipline,
we should recall some other features of Anglo-American equity.
The adequacy-of-alternative remedies test, as we now use it, could
hardly have been framed by a freely rational mind, but it has in
fact an important function. Since most equitable remedies are
specific remedies, aiming at something more than execution
against property, the practical effect of the adequacy test is to
limit the area in which coercion will be employed. But there are
some other self-denying ordinances also that are employed by
equity courts. In contract cases, as in other equity cases, higher
standards of fairness and morality are regularly employed. This
double standard of morality is a clumsy and ineffective way of
100 16 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DRorr CIVIL FRANCAIS, 3d ed., no. 198 (1878): "Liberty
is not involved in an obligation to give: public force is addressed to an object and not
to a man. But in obligations to do, -human liberty is involved in the sense that the
obligation cannot be enforced through violence to a person who has obligated himself
'not to do'; this would :be an assault on liberty, a crime. Man is free not to perform his
promises, subject to incurring the consequences of his default: one could not take away
this freedom through using violence. It is true that the text of the Code does not say
this, but the spirit of the law leaves no doubt." A similar view, much more briefly stated,
appears in 2 AcoLLAS, MANUEL DE DROIT CIVIL 720-721 (1869).
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alleviating hardship or discouraging sharp bargainers, if the contract whose enforcement in equity is refused is left open for enforcement by way of damage remedy. 101 It is in fact surprising that
the special scruples shown in administering equitable relief should
have lasted so long after our chancellors had laid aside their
ecclesiastical robes. The vague tests employed in equity, especially in specific performance cases, are not framed so as to take
into account in any way the coercive features of equitable relief.
Yet there may be an obscure connection between the "exceptional" nature of specific performance-the formal reason usually
given for these special tests-and the greater weight of the public
force that is mobilized by equity procedure. Whether this is true
or not, the effect of this type of self-denying ordinance is, like the
effect of the adequacy test, to narrow the area in which direct coercion can be used.
Related to these higher standards of morality are the requirements of mutuality. Mutuality of remedy, that artificial creation
of Lord Justice Fry, was unbelievably academic. It was sufficiently
dealt with by Edgar Durfee in one of his most influential and
discriminating articles.102 Mutuality of performance, the substitute that Edgar urged and helped to formulate, is now increasingly
used and is likely to stay with us, for it has much appeal. The
essential thought is that it is unfair to coerce a promised performance unless adequate guarantees can be framed that the defendant
will receive the promised counter-performance or else be assured
of a safe withdrawal through restitution. In this formulation there
emerges somewhat nearer the surface the notion that the coercive
powers of equity should not be used if they will leave their victim
at a serious disadvantage-their variety and severity are reasons
for using them with restraint.
Another self-denying ordinance, used very widely in contract
cases and very seldom in injunction against tort, is the doctrine
that specific performance should be refused where difficulties of
enforcement or supervision are to be expected. Some of the
earlier decisions applying this doctrine can hardly be read without
exasperation. Specific performance of a railroad's promise to

101 Comment, 32 MICH. L. REv. 518 (1934). A different view on this issue is suggested
by Frank and Endicott, "Defenses in Equity and 'Legal Rights,'" 14 LA. L. REv. 380
(1954).
102 Durfee, "Mutuality in Specific Performance," 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 289 (1922).
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build a railroad station and to stop trains at the station is refused because the court has not the time to build the station
or flag the trains and the railroad doesn't know how. A building
contractor will not be ordered to repair a structure because no
one will be able to tell whether the repairs conform to the
contract. In their origins these ideas carried a load of snobbery,
expressed in distaste for menial tasks-"how can a master judge
of repairs in husbandry?" 103 They often disguised the courts'
concern for interests of third persons or the general public-a
legitimate concern, though somewhat hard to formulate. 104 There
also entered, to a degree that is hard to estimate, a psychological
factor-the feeling that an equity decree was an expression of
the judge's own personal will, so that his prestige and thus the
prestige of all the courts was threatened in any disobedience.
There is much confusion here, I suggest, that is a reflection of
the larger confusion over the contempt power itself. An affront
to the court may be involved, but not necessarily, any more
than in a judgment debtor's non-payment of a money judgment.
In cases of this kind we find an expression of judicial timidity and
self-distrust, which took an extravagant form in nineteenth
century cases though it is somewhat diminished in more recent
cases. But the net effect is to exclude the coercive powers of
equity courts from those situations in which (1) conflict and
resistance might embroil the courts unduly and (2) the absence
of clear standards would make undefined threats of punishment
unfair to the defendant. Which of these two themes is predominant in most of the cases would be hard to say, since both
are usually involved.
The interesting question is whether we, like the French,
have become prisoners of our own system-or, more accurately,
whether we have become confused by our lack of system. Would
our courts be more willing to grant specific performance if a
sharp line were drawn and firmly maintained between civil and
criminal contempt-between execution process for the benefit
of the litigant and punishment for attack on judicial authority?
103 Rayner v. Stone, 2 Eden 128,
104 This appears, for example, in

28 Eng. Rep. 845 (1762).
Blanchard v. Detroit, L. &: L. M. R. Co., 31 Mich.
43 (1875), where the indefiniteness of the railroad's obligations and the court's preoccupation with other matters were the reasons given, but the court was also quite evidently
concerned with the long-term burden on a public utility in being required to stop trains
after the need for local railroad service had ditninished.
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Why must every equity order, except some decrees establishing
simple money debts, be thought of as carrying implicitly the
threat of arrest, money fine, sequestration-the whole panoply
of coercive devices that our equity courts draw on at their
discretion? Our courts could surely have made a much wider use
of substituted performance, by plaintiff, by third parties or by
receivers and other persons that they temporarily invest with
a limited public authority. This could be done without any
commitment to go further with money fines and especially with
arrest. If limited means were adapted to limited ends, with
greater selectivity, more might be attempted and the barriers
to specific performance that we have inherited might be reduced.
As to some classes of promises-e.g., promises to transfer specific
assets-they might disappear.
I have no statistics and would find them hard to collect, but,
apart from land contracts, it appears to me that specific performance is still in fact what the courts have described it to
be in theory-an exceptional remedy. Apart from land contracts,
the adequacy-of-alternative-remedy test cuts off vast numbers
of contracts, and those that pass this test will then meet a
whole series of additional tests. We have in fact cut down the
area in which direct coercion is possible, using a number of
self-denying principles that are expressed in different terms.
We entrust great power to our judges, but then proceed by other
means to destroy most of the opportunities for the exercise of
power. The question one is left with is whether there is any
connection between the magnitude of the power and the reluctance to employ it.

